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Abstract—The fusion of social networks and wearable sensors
is becoming increasingly popular, with systems like Fitbit au-
tomating the process of reporting and sharing user fitness data. In
this paper we show that while compelling, the careless integration
of health data into social networks is fraught with privacy and
security vulnerabilities. Case in point, by reverse engineering the
communication protocol, storage details and operation codes, we
identified several vulnerabilities in Fitbit. We have built FitBite,
a suite of tools that exploit these vulnerabilities to launch a wide
range of attacks against Fitbit. Besides eavesdropping, injection
and denial of service, several attacks can lead to rewards and
financial gains. We have built FitLock, a lightweight defense
system that protects Fitbit while imposing only a small overhead.
Our experiments on BeagleBoard and Xperia devices show that
FitLock’s end-to-end overhead over Fitbit is only 2.4%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks are sites that enable their users to
connect and share information with friends and family. Recent
advances in wearable, user-friendly devices equipped with
smart sensors (e.g., pedometers, heart rate and sleep monitors)
and wireless technologies, are facilitating the emergence of
social sensor networks (SSNs): social networks that collect
and share not only explicit user information (e.g., status
updates, location reports) but also implicit health-centric data.
Fitbit [1], a representative social sensor network centers its
existence on fitness sensor data. It consists of (i) trackers,
wireless-enabled, wearable devices that record their users’
daily step counts, distance traversed, calories burned and floors
climbed as well as sleep patterns when worn during the night
and (ii) an online social network that automatically captures,
displays and shares fitness data of its users. Figure 1 illustrates
the basic functionality of Fitbit.
While popular and useful in its encouragement of healthy
lifestyles, the combination of health sensors and social net-
works makes social sensor networks the source of significant
privacy and security issues. In this paper we show that Fitbit is
vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. Besides standard social
networking problems, including infiltration attacks [2] and
private data leaks to general account holders 1, Fitbit is made
vulnerable by the wireless nature of tracker communications
and poor security practices.
1Fitbit has suffered criticism due to its initial default access control settings:
The reported sensor information was made publicly available on Fitbit’s social
network.
Fig. 1. Social Sensor Network (SSN) illustration. Health sensor devices and
corresponding data reported, displayed and shared with friends. The user’s
last name is anonymized.
Fitbit relies on a Personal Area Network (PAN) protocol [3]
called ANT [4], that enables trackers to automatically upload
their data to the online social network account of their user.
The improper design of Fitbit’s communication protocol, (i)
allows Fitbit users to engineer their fitness data and inject
it into their social networking accounts, thus gain financial
benefits and (ii) enables external attackers to intercept data
reported by trackers of other users, inject arbitrary data into
the trackers and online social network accounts of other users,
as well as launch denial of service attacks.
In order to expose Fitbit’s vulnerabilities, in a first contri-
bution, we have reverse engineered the semantics of tracker
memory banks, the command types and the tracker-to-social
network communication protocol. In a second contribution, we
have built FitBite, a suite of tools that exploit Fitbit’s faulty
design. We have used FitBite to prove the feasibility of a wide
range of attacks. For instance, we show that FitBite allows
attackers to capture and modify the data stored on any tracker
situated within a radius of 15 ft.
In a third contribution, we propose FitLock, a lightweight
extension that uses efficient cryptographic tools to secure the
Fitbit protocol. We show that FitLock prevents the FitBite at-
tacks. Our end-to-end implementation on BeagleBoard [5] and
Xperia devices shows that the computation and communication
overhead imposed by FitLock is small: resource constrained
BeagleBoard and Xperia devices can support hundreds of
packet encryption and transmission operations per second.
Moreover, the end-to-end overhead of the cryptographic opera-
tions employed by FitLock over the standard Fitbit protocol is
only 2.4% on a Xperia device. The project website containing
the source code of FitBite and FitLock is made publicly
available at [6].
Fig. 2. Fitbit system components: trackers (one mounted on the base), the
base (arrow indicated), user laptop. The arrow pointing to the tracker shows
the switch button, allowing the user to display various fitness data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the Fitbit model, including background on the ANT protocol,
and details the attacker model considered. Section III reverse
engineers Fitbit and Section IV introduces FitBite, the suite
of attack tools. Section V introduces FitLock, our defense
extension and proves its security. Section VI describes our
implementation results. Section VII describes related work and
Section VIII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND MODEL
The Fitbit system consists of user tracker devices, user USB
base stations and an online social network.
Fitbit tracker. The Fitbit tracker is a wearable device that
relies on a 3D motion sensor and a barometric pressure sensor
to measure the daily steps taken, distance traveled, floors
climbed, calories burned, and the duration and intensity of
the user exercise. The tracker mainly consists of four IC
chips, (i) a MMA7341L 3-axis MEMS accelerometer, (ii) a
MSP430F2618 low power TI MCU consisting of 92 KB of
flash and 96 KB of RAM, (iii) a nRF24API 2.4 GHz RF chip
supporting the ANT protocol (1 Mbits/sec, 15 ft transmission
range) and (iv) a MEMS altimeter to count the number
of floors climbed. The user can switch between displaying
different real-time fitness information on the tracker, using a
dedicated hardware switch button (see the arrow pointing to
the switch in Figure 2). Each tracker has a unique id, called
the tracker public id (TPI).
Data conversion. The accelerometer and the altimeter allow
the tracker to count the steps taken and the floors climbed by
the user. The tracker relies on extrapolated walk/run stride
length values to convert the step count into the distance
covered by the user: the sum of the recorded walking steps
times the user walking stride length and of the running steps
times the user running stride length. The running steps are
identified based on the frequency and intensity of the user’s
steps. The tracker uses the extrapolated user Basal Metabolic
Rate (BMR) [7] values to convert the user’s daily activities
into the number of calories burned.
The base. The second component, the Fitbit base, connects
to the user’s main compute center (e.g., PC, laptop) and is
equipped with a wireless communication chip that enables it
to communicate with any tracker within a range of 15 ft. The
base acts as a bridge between trackers and the online social
network. It sets up connections with all the trackers within its
transmission range, then reads and clears up the information
stored on the tracker according to commands issued by the
social network. Figure 2 shows a snapshot of two trackers and
a base, connected to a laptop through a USB port.
The webserver. The third component, the online social net-
work, allows users to create accounts from which they befriend
and maintain contact with other users. Upon purchase of a
Fitbit tracker and base, a user binds the tracker to her social
network account. Each social network account has a unique
id, called the user public id (UPI). After the base detects and
sets up a connection with the tracker, the base automatically
collects and reports tracker stored information (step count,
distance, calories, sleep patterns) to the corresponding social
network account. Based on user preferences, this data is either
made public, shared with the user’s friends, or kept private.
In the following, we use the term webserver to denote the
computing resources of the online social network.
Tracker-to-base communication: the ANT protocol. Track-
ers communicate to bases over ANT. ANT is a 2.4 GHz
bidirectional wireless Personal Area Network (PAN) commu-
nications technology optimized for transferring low-data rate,
low-latency data between multiple ANT-enabled devices. The
ultra-low power consumption of the ANT chipset guarantees
an extended battery life even from low-capacity supplies such
as a coin cell battery. This, along with the low implementation
cost of ANT, enables its integration and use in a wide range
of mobile devices, including smartphones and health sensors.
A. Attacker Model
We assume the existence of not only external attackers but
also insiders. External attackers attempt to learn and modify
the fitness information reported by the trackers of other users,
as well as disrupt the Fitbit protocol. Insiders own Fitbit
trackers and may attempt to report fitness values that do not
reflect their effort, e.g., inflate reports or replay old values.
We assume external attackers do not have physical access to
trackers of other users. However, attackers are able to capture
wireless communications in their vicinity. Furthermore, we
assume that the Fitbit service (e.g. the social network servers)
does not collude with attackers to facilitate false data reports.
III. REVERSE ENGINEERING FITBIT
We document here the results of our effort to reverse engi-
neer the Fitbit communication protocol, including the message
communication format among the participating devices. Our
endeavor has relied on information from libfitbit [8] for open
source health hardware access.
Fitbit uses service logs, files that store information con-
cerning communications involving the base. On the Windows
installation of the Fitbit software, daily logs are stored in
cleartext in files whose names record the hour, minute and
second corresponding to the time of the first log occurrence.
Each request and response involving the tracker, base and
social network is logged and sometimes even documented in
the archive folder of that log directory. The logs have proved
central to our understanding and reverse engineering of the
functionality of Fitbit.
Data retrieved from the tracker to be uploaded to the
social network is encoded in base64 format. However, no
authentication is used, and all requests are sent in clear HTTP.
We have exploited Fitbit’s lack of encryption in the messages
sent between the base and the tracker to implement a USB
based filter driver that separately logs the data flowing to and
from the base.
In the following we present details of the organization of the
tracker memory banks, then describe the main Fitbit opcodes
and then present the reverse engineered Fitbit communication
protocol.
A. Memory Banks
A tracker has two types of memory banks, (i) read banks,
containing data to be read by the base and (ii) write banks,
containing data that can be written by the base. The log
data we captured reveals that during the upload session, the
webserver reads data from 6 memory banks, writes on 2 write
memory banks and clears data from 5 memory banks by
sending requests to the tracker through the base. The byte
length of memory banks varies. We now briefly describe the
most important read and write memory banks.
Read banks. The read bank #1 stores the daily user fitness
records. Each record is 16 bytes long. It starts with a 4 byte
long timestamp, followed by the number of calories, steps,
distance and floor count. Both steps and distance are stored
on four bytes while the calories and the floor count are stored
on two bytes. To ensure reliability, Fitbit stores the important
fitness records (e.g., step and floor count) on multiple memory
banks.
Write banks. The write bank #0 stores 64 bytes concerning
the device settings as specified on the user’s Fitbit account (the
“Device Settings” and “Profile Settings” links). The write bank
#1 stores 16 bytes that contain the daily user fitness records
whose data format is similar to the read memory bank 0.
B. Opcodes and Responses
The webserver communicates with a tracker through a base.
The communication is embedded in XML blocks, that contain
base64 encoded opcodes – commands for the tracker. Opcodes
are 7 bytes long. We briefly list below the most important
opcodes and their corresponding responses. The opcode types
are also shown in Figure 3.
Retrieve device information (TRQ-REQ): opcode
[0x24, 0(6times)]. Upon receiving this opcode from the
webserver (via the base), the tracker includes in a reply its
serial number (5 bytes), the hardware revision number, and
whether the tracker is plugged in on the base.
Read/write tracker memory. To read a memory bank,
the webserver needs to issue the READ-TRQ opcode,
[0x22, index, 0(5times)], where index denotes the mem-
ory bank requested. The response embeds the content
Fig. 3. Fitbit protocol between the tracker, base and the Fitbit webserver
of the specified memory bank. To write data to a
memory bank, the webserver issues the WRITE opcode
[0x23, index, datalength, 0(4times)]. The payload data is
sent along with the opcode. The value index denotes the desti-
nation memory bank and datalen is the length of the payload.
A successful operation returns the response [0x41, 0(6times)].
Erase memory: (ERASE) opcode [0x25, index, time, 0]. The
webserver specifies the index denoting the memory bank to
be erased. time (4 bytes, MSB) is the operation deadline -
the date until which the data should be erased. A successful
operation returns the response [0x41, 0(6times)].
C. The Fitbit Communication Protocol
In the following, for brevity, we use the notation “URL”
to denote the full URL http://client.fitbit.com. The data flow
between the tracker, base and the webserver during the data
upload operation, illustrated in Figure 3, is divided into 4
phases, beginning at steps 2, 3, 5 and 7:
1) Upon receiving a beacon from the tracker, the base
establishes a connection with the tracker.
2) Phase 1: The base contacts the webserver at the
URL/device/tracker/uploadData and sends basic client
and platform information.
3) Phase 2: The webserver sends the tracker id and the
opcode for retrieving tracker information (TRQ-REQ).
4) The base contacts the specified tracker, retrieves its
information TRQ-INFO (serial number, firmware ver-
sion, etc.) and sends it to the webserver at the
URL/device/tracker/dumpData/lookupTracker.
5) Phase 3: Given the tracker’s serial number, the webserver
retrieves the associated tracker public id (TPI) and user
public id (UPI) values. The webserver sends to the base
the TPI/UPI values along with the opcodes for retrieving
fitness data from the tracker (READ-TRQ).
6) The base forwards the TPI and UPI values and the
opcodes to the tracker, retrieves the fitness data from the
Fig. 4. Fitbit service logs: Proof of login credentials sent in cleartext in a
HTTP POST request sent from the base to the webserver.
tracker (TRQ-DATA) and sends it to the webserver at the
URL/device/tracker/dumpData/dumpData.
7) Phase 4: The webserver sends to the base opcodes to
WRITE updates provided by the user in her Fitbit social
network account (device and profile settings, e.g., body
and personal information, time zone, etc). This operation
takes place irrespective of whether the user has updated
her settings since the last communication with the tracker
or not. The base forwards the WRITE opcode and the
updates to the tracker, who overwrites the previous values
on its write memory banks.
8) The webserver sends opcodes to ERASE the fitness
data from the tracker. The base forwards the ERASE
request to the tracker, who then erases the contents of
the corresponding read memory banks.
9) The base forwards the response codes for the exe-
cuted opcodes from the tracker to the webserver at the
URL/device/tracker/dumpData/clearDataConfigTracker.
10) The webserver replies to the base with the opcode to
CLOSE the tracker.
11) The base requests the tracker to SLEEP for 15 minutes,
before sending its next beacon.
IV. FITBITE: ATTACKING FITBIT
We first describe two vulnerabilities of Fitbit, followed
by details of the attacks we have deployed to exploit these
vulnerabilities.
A. Vulnerabilities
Cleartext login information. During the initial user login via
the Fitbit client software, user passwords are passed to the
website in cleartext (as part of POST data) and then stored in
the log files. Figure 4 shows a snippet of captured data, with
the cleartext authentication credentials emphasized.
Cleartext HTTP Data processing. When syncing data to the
website, no data protection/authentication is used – all requests
are sent over plain HTTP. Capturing tracker data and injecting
data into trackers and social network accounts becomes thus
possible.
B. The FitBite Tool
We have built FitBite, a suite of tools that exploit the
above vulnerabilities to attack Fitbit. FitBite consists of two
modules. The Base Module (BM) is used to retrieve data
Fig. 5. Outcome of Tracker Injection (TI) attack on Fitbit tracker.
Fig. 6. Snapshot of Fitbit user account data injection attack.
from the tracker, inject false values and upload them into
the account of the corresponding user on the webserver. The
Tracker Module (TM) is used to read and write the tracker
data. FitBite implements the following attacks.
Tracker Private Data Capture (TPDC). FitBite uses the TM
module to discover any tracker device within a radius of 15
ft and capture the fitness information stored on the tracker.
This attack can be launched in public spaces, particularly those
frequented by Fitbit users (e.g., parks, sports venues, etc).
Tracker Injection (TI) Attack. FitBite uses the TM module
along with knowledge of the data and memory bank formats
and required opcode instructions to modify any of the “real-
time” fitness data stored on neighboring trackers. FitBite
allows the attacker to choose the data to be modified. It then
reads the data from the storing memory bank and modifies the
target bytes while keeping the remaining locations unmodified.
The TM can act however modify simultaneously multiple
fitness records (memory banks).
Figure 5 shows an example of a victim tracker, displaying
an inflated value for the (daily) number of steps taken by its
user. Note that the tracker’s owner (an insider) can also launch
this attack.
User Account Injection (UAI) Attack. Fitbit allows a
tracker to report its data to the user’s social network ac-
count through any USB base in its vicinity (15 ft. ra-
dius). Specifically, in step 6.b of the Fitbit protocol (see
Figure 3) the base sends the data to the webserver at the
Fig. 7. Earndit points and available gift cards
URL/device/tracker/dumpData/dumpData. FitBite enables an
attacker to hijack the data reported by trackers in its vicinity,
through the attacker’s corrupt USB base. FitBite uses the BM
module to launch the data injection attack by fabricating a
data reply embedding the desired fitness data (encoded in the
base64 format). The BM sends the reply as an XML block in
an HTTP request to the web server. The webserver does not
authenticate the request message and does not check for data
consistency – thus it accepts the data.
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of one account where we have
successfully injected the number of steps taken by the “account
owner”, while keeping the other values intact. This shows that
(i) FitBite can inject an unreasonable daily step count (12.58
million) into the account of any tracker owner located in its
vicinity and (ii) Fitbit does not check data consistency – the
12.58 million steps are shown to correspond to 0.02 traveled
miles.
Free Badges. By successful injection of large values in their
social networking accounts, FitBite enables insiders to achieve
special milestones and acquire merit badges, without doing the
required work. Figure 6 shows that the injected value of 12.58
million steps, being greater than 40,000, enables the account
owner to acquire a “Top Daily Step” badge.
Free Financial Rewards. Fitbit users can link their social
networking accounts to systems that reward users for exercis-
ing, e.g., Earndit [9] provides gift cards and financial prizes.
An Earndit user receives 0.75 points for each of her “very
active” Fitbit minute and 0.10 points per a “fairly active”
minute. By keeping the BM module running and continuously
updating the tracker data (once each 15 minutes), FitBite
allows an insider to easily record “fairly active” minutes.
We have created an Earndit account, linked it to one of our
Fitbit accounts and used FitBite to accumulate a variety of
undeserved rewards. Figure 7 shows an example where we
have accumulated 200 Earndit points, that can be redeemed to
a $20 gift card.
Battery Drain Attack. FitBite allows the attacker to contin-
uously query trackers in her vicinity, thus drain their batteries
at a faster rate. To understand the efficiency of this attack, we
have experimented with 3 operation modes. First, the daily
upload mode, where the tracker syncs with the USB base and
the Fitbit account once per day. Second, the 15 mins upload
Fig. 8. Battery drain for three operation modes. The attack mode severely
reduced the battery lifetime.
mode, where we kept the tracker within 15 ft. of the base, thus
allowing it to be queried once every 15 minutes. Finally, the
attack mode, where FitBite’s TM module continuously (an
average of 4 times a minute) queried the victim tracker. In
order to not raise suspicions, the BM module uploaded tracker
data into the webserver only once every 15 minutes.
Figure 8 shows our battery experiment results for the three
modes. In the daily upload mode, the battery lasted for 29
days. In the 15 mins upload mode, the battery lasted for 186.38
hours (7 days and 18 hours). In the attack mode, the battery
lasted for a total of 32.71 hours. While this attack is not fast
enough to impact trackers targeted by casual attackers, it shows
that FitBite drains the tracker battery around 21 times faster
than the 1 day upload mode and 5.63 times faster than the 15
mins upload mode.
Denial of Service. FitBite’s injection attack can be used to
prevent users from correctly updating their real-time statistics.
A tracker can display up to 6 digit values. Thus, when the
injected value exceeds 6 digits, the least significant digits can
not be displayed on the tracker. This prevents the user from
keeping track of her daily performance evolution.
Mule Attacks. Besides attacks exploiting Fitbit’s unprotected
wireless communications, adversaries may also launch phys-
ical, mule attacks, by attaching trackers to various moving
objects. This enables the adversary to increase fitness param-
eters with significantly less effort than walking. In a first,
rope attack, the adversary spins the tracker attached to a rope
(Figure 9(a) illustrates this attack). Our experiments show that
the step count increase in the rope attack is a function of
the rope length. For a 1ft rope, the step count increases by 1
for each circumvolution; for a 2ft rope length, the step count
increases by 2 per circumvolution.
While the rope attack requires perseverance, in a second,
wheel attack, the adversary attaches a tracker to a car wheel.
This enables the attacker to effortlessly increase the recorded
step count, distance and calorie values when driving. Fig-
ure 9(b) shows a picture of our “testbed”. We have ex-
perimented with this setup, by driving the car over several
20 minutes sessions. Figure 9(c) shows the outcome of our
experiment, in terms of the number of steps and the calories
recorded by the tracker as a function of time, displayed with a
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Fig. 9. Physical attack: (a) Spinning a tracker, when tied with different rope lengths. (b) Attaching tracker on car wheel. (c) Effectiveness of wheel attack:
evolution of tracker recorded number of steps and calories in time.
4 minute granularity. At the end of the experiment, the tracker
recorded 1166 steps, 211 calories and 0.9 miles (1.44km).
We used the “My Tracks” Android application [10] which
relies on GPS readings to measure the average speed and dis-
tance traversed by the car. At an average speed of 16.53kmh,
the tracker increases the step count by approx. 58 steps per
minute. The tire type is P17565R14, with a radius of 11.48
inches and a circumference of 72.12 inches (≈ 1.83m). The
tracker was placed 5.85 inches apart from the center of the tire.
Thus, for the circular path of the tracker, the circumference is
36.76 inches (≈ 0.93m).
The average distance covered by the car for each 20 minutes
session was 5.51km, when the tire rotated 5510/1.83=3010
times. Given the tracker’s circumference (0.93m), the tracker
actually travels 2.8km for the 3010 times tire rotations. The
running stride length of the user bonded with the test tracker
is approx. 0.9m, which converts the 2.8km into 3111 steps.
While these values (2.8km/3111 steps) are inconsistent with
the 1.44km/1166 steps recorded by the tracker, we note that the
tracker’s values are consistent: the tracker converts the steps
into distance according to the user stride length.
V. FITLOCK: PROTECTING FITBIT
A good Fitbit solution needs to (i) protect against internal
and external attackers, by authenticating the system partici-
pants, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and freshness of
system information, and preventing denial of service attacks,
while simultaneously (ii) taking into consideration the extreme
resource limitations of Fitbit trackers. In this section we
introduce FitLock, a solution that secures the Fitbit system
and is efficient in terms of the imposed computation, storage
and communication overheads.
A. The Solution
FitLock consists of a bind procedure (BindUserTracker),
where the user associates a new tracker to her online so-
cial network account and an upload procedure (UploadData),
where the tracker reports information upon demand from the
social network. Each tracker T has a unique serial number idT
and a secret symmetric encryption key skT , shared with the
webserver. These values are stored in a write-once-read-many
(WORM) area of the tracker’s memory banks. The tracker
never reveals (e.g., displays or communicates) the secret key.
The webserver stores a database Map that associates a tracker
id to tracker related data, including symmetric key, user id
and session id. Initially, Map only maps tracker ids into
corresponding symmetric encryption keys.
Let IdA denote the unique user id of the account that user
A has on the Fitbit social network. In the following, we use
the notation F (P1(args1), .., Pn(argsn)) to denote a protocol
F running between participants P1,..Pn, each with its own
input arguments. For instance, the following BindTrackerUser
protocol involves user A, with her account id and a time
interval s as input arguments, her tracker T, with its id and
secret key as arguments, her base B with no arguments and
the (Fitbit) webserver WS, with its Map structure as input
argument. The BindTrackerUser protocol allows user A to bind
her new tracker to her social network account (illustrated in
Figure 10).
BindTrackerUser(A(IdA,s),T(idT , skT ),B(),WS(Map)).
User A logs in into her account on the Fitbit social network
(step 1 in Figure 10). A presses T’s switch button for s
seconds (step 2). Upon this action, the tracker T reports its
identifier idT in cleartext to WS, through the user’s base (step
3). WS uses the Map structure to retrieve the symmetric key
associated with the idT , i.e., skT (step 4). It then generates
a 6 digit long random value, N (step 5). WS sends to T the
request value
idT , EskT (“WS
′′, T ime,N),
where T ime is WS’s current time (step 6). WS keeps track of
all requests sent to trackers and pending responses, indexed
under the tracker id and the nonce value. WS associates an
expiration time with each entry, and removes entries as they
expire without being answered.
Upon reception of this message, T uses its symmetric key,
skT , to decrypt it. It verifies the freshness (the T ime value)
and authenticates WS through its ability to have encrypted this
message, containing the string “WS”, using the key skT . If the
verifications succeed, the tracker displays the 6 digit random
nonce N (step 7). User A reads and enters this nonce into a
confirmation box in her Fitbit social network account (step 9).
Fig. 10. The BindTrackerUser protocol between the user, tracker and the
(Fitbit) webserver
Then, if WS finds any pending (not expired) request matching
the value entered by the user, WS associates IdA to idT and
skT in the Map structure (step 10). WS removes this request
from the list of pending requests.
The following procedure, UploadData, is used to secure
the Fitbit communication protocol described in Section III.
It involves a tracker T (taking as arguments its id idT , secret
key skT , stored fitness data, expiration interval δt and retry
counter r), a base B (with no arguments) and the webserver
WS (with its Map structure and the same expiration intervals
and counter as T).
All communication between T and WS is encrypted with
their shared key skT . Each communication session between
WS and T has a monotonically increasing session id Swst. T
and WS do not accept messages with older session id numbers.
UploadData(T(idT ,skT ,data,δt,r),B(),WS(Map,δt,r)). A new
session starts only after the tracker’s beacon is received by the
base and the base sets up a connection with the tracker (step
1). Within each session, the communication between WS and
T starts with a request from WS followed by a response from
T. Each request contains a request type REQ ∈ {TRQ-REQ,
READ-TRQ, WRITE, ERASE, CLOSE} (see Figure 3), and
a counter Cws encoding the number of times this particular
request has been re-transmitted. Within a session, T stores the
latest Cws received from WS for any request type, or -1 if no
request has been received yet. Thus, a request from WS to T
has the format
idT , EskT (REQ,Swst, Cws),
where Swst is the current session id and Cws is set to 0 for
the first transmission of the current REQ type. Upon receiving
such a message, the base B uses idT to route the packet to the
correct tracker T in its vicinity. T uses its secret key to decrypt
the packet and authenticate WS: verify that the first field is a
meaningful request type, the second field contains the current
session id and the value of the third field exceeds its currently
stored value for REQ. If either verification fails, T drops the
packet. Otherwise, T stores the received Cws value, associated
with the REQ type for the current session, and replies to this
request with
idT , EskT (RESP, Swst, CT ),
where RESP ∈ {TRQ-INFO, TRQ-DATA, CLEAR} denotes
T’s response type (see Figure 3) and CT is its counter
(initialized to 0).
WS waits a predefined interval δt to receive the reply RESP
from T. If it does not receive it in time, WS repeats the request,
with an incremented counter Cws. If WS’s re-transmission
counter reaches a maximum value, r, and no corresponding
RESP is received within the δt interval, WS increments the
session id Swst. Similarly, if C’s re-transmission counter
reaches the maximum value r and the next request is not
received from WS, T increments Swst. This means that T and
WS consider themselves to have been disconnected and their
next communication needs to start from the beginning (step 1
of Figure 3)) with a new session id. If T receives a REQ from
WS that has a session id larger (by 1) than its current session
id, T drops the data associated with the current session, and
begins a new session with the incremented session id.
At the successful completion of a session, both T and WS
increment the session id Swst. WS stores this value in Map
indexed under idT .
B. Data Consistency
As mentioned in Section II, there exists a strong relationship
between the different activity parameters tracked by Fitbit.
However, as demonstrated by the UAI attack in Section IV,
Fitbit does not verify the consistency of the data reported
by trackers. FitLock addresses this vulnerability: Whenever
new user data is uploaded on the webserver, FitLock uses
the walk/run stride length and the BMR values to verify the
relations between the number of steps (walking and running)
and the distance traversed and the calories burned by the
user. If the relations do not hold (including an error margin),
FitLock considers that the data has been victim of an injection
attack.
C. Analysis
We now prove several properties of FitLock.
Theorem 1: Without physical access to the tracker, an at-
tacker cannot hijack the tracker during the BindTrackerUser
procedure.
Proof: A tracker hijack attack, takes place during a
normal execution of the BindTrackerUser procedure by
a victim user for her tracker T. The adversary attempts to
bind the victim tracker T to another user account, potentially
controlled by the attacker. Let M denotes the Fitbit account
owned by the adversary. Without physical access to the tracker,
the adversary cannot read the 6 digit random nonce displayed
on the tracker and upload it in M .
However, the adversary is able to capture packets exchanged
by WS and T during a BindTrackerUser procedure. The
adversary could then attempt launch a rush attack. In a rush
attack, the adversary decrypts a captured packet, recovers the
nonce N sent by WS to T, and uploads it in M , before the
valid user.
Rush attacks are prevented by the semantic security of the
encryption scheme of FitLock – the adversary cannot recover
the nonce.
FitLock prevents the TPDC attack through the use of
semantically secure encryption. The non-malleability of the
encryption also prevents injection TI, UAI and ensuing free
badge and financial rewards attacks, generated from previously
captured (encrypted) messages. The use of session identifiers
and re-transmission counters prevents replay attacks.
Theorem 2: FitLock prevents DoS and Battery Drain at-
tacks.
Proof: (Sketch) FitLock’s use of semantically secure
symmetric encryption to protect communications, prevents
attackers from obtaining a response from trackers. The attacker
cannot replay requests with old session ids or old counters
(for the current session id): Upon receiving invalid requests or
requests with old session ids or old counter values, the tracker
drops them, thus does not consume power to answer them.
Thwarting mule attacks. The sensors present in Fitbit track-
ers are insufficient to prevent insider, mule attacks: the adver-
sary has control over the tracker and the step count recorded by
the tracker is consistently converted into distance and calorie
values. We propose however two defenses against this attack,
relying on the addition of new sensors on Fitbit trackers.
A first solution relies on GPS chips installed in Fitbit track-
ers. Broadcom offers BCM4752 [11], an inexpensive, energy
efficient (it uses 50% less power than equivalent receivers),
small (takes up nearly half the size of comparable chips) and
performant – delivers 10 times more accurate readings, and
works indoors. By comparing the distance recorded by the
GPS receiver against the distance recorded by the tracker, we
can discover inconsistencies both for rope and wheel attacks.
During a rope attack, the GPS location does not change.
During a wheel attack the GPS location changes too much
compared to the number of recorded steps.
A second solution relies on the inclusion of a small heart-
rate monitor (HRM) which can be well suited inside the Fitbit
tracker (e.g., the AD8232 AFE [12] which comes in a 4 × 4-
mm sized package). The HRM device measures cardiovascular
electrical signals from the heart and the tracker only records
the user’s activity if it gets such signals from the user. It
ensures that the user is actually wearing the tracker, thus
trivially preventing rope or wheel attacks.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We implemented FitLock in Android. We have tested the
tracker side of FitLock on a Revision C4 of the Beagle-
Board [5] and an Xperia smartphone. The BeagleBoard uses
the OMAP 3530 DCCB72 720 MHz version and uses a
4500 mAh Li-ion battery to power our system through a
special, 2-pin barrel jack. The Sony Ericsson Xperia X10 mini
smartphone features an ARM 11 CPU @600 MHz and 128MB
RAM with Android OS Eclair 2.1. Similar to the Fitbit tracker,
Fig. 11. Snapshot of testbed for FitLock, consisting of BeagleBoard and
Xperia devices used as Fitbit trackers.
the Xperia device supports ANT+. In addition, we have used
two Dell laptops, one equipped with a 2.4GHz Intel Core i5
and 4GB of RAM, was used for the web server (built on the
Apache web server 2.4) and the other, equipped with a 2.3GHz
Intel Core i5 and 4GB of RAM, was used for the base.
We implemented a client-server Bluetooth [13] socket com-
munication protocol between the tracker (Xperia smartphone)
and the base using PyBluez [14] python library. In PyBluez,
each device acts as a server and other connected devices act as
clients in P2P communications. For connectivity between the
base and the webserver, the laptops use their own 802.11b/g
Wi-Fi interfaces. Figure 11 shows a snapshot of our testbed.
For encryption we experimented with RC4 [15], AES [16]
and the Salsa20 [17] stream cipher, selected in the final
eSTREAM portfolio [18]. The 20-round Salsa20 is built on
a pseudorandom function based on 32-bit addition, bitwise
addition (XOR) and rotation operations. It uses a 256-bit key,
a 64-bit nonce, and a 64-bit stream position to a 512-bit
output. As of 2012, there are no published attacks on the full
Salsa20/20; the best attack known [19] breaks 8 of the 20
rounds.
B. Results
In the following, all reported values are averages taken over
at least 10 independent protocol runs.
Key generation overhead. We have first measured the over-
head of generating (AES) secret keys. Figure 12 shows the
overhead on the laptop and the Xperia device, when the key
bit size ranges from 64 to 1024 bits. Note that even a resource
constrained smartphone takes only 2.46 ms to generate 1024
bit keys (0.62ms on the laptop).
FitLock overhead on tracker. A potential bottleneck of
FitLock is in the encryption of packets by the tracker. In
order to verify if this can be the case, we compared the
performance of RC4, Salsa20 and AES. We set the key size
to 128 bits. We ran these protocols both on the BeagleBoard
and the Xperia while the packet size ranges from 32 bytes to
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Fig. 13. FitLock overhead. (a) Encryption time overhead on Xperia. (b) Comparison of Salsa20 encryption time overhead when tested on BeagleBoard and
Xperia. (c) Decryption time overhead on webserver (Dell laptop).
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1024 bytes. Figure 13(a) shows the execution time of the three
protocols on the Xperia smartphone. For small packet sizes,
Salsa20 performs the best. As the packet size increases, RC4
performs slight better than Salsa20. Both RC4 and Salsa20
outperform AES for any packet size. Even for a packet size
of 1024 bytes, the average encryption times for RC4, Salsa20
and AES are only 3.24ms, 4.62ms and 4.83ms respectively.
In Figure 13(b), we compared the encryption overhead of
Salsa20 when running on the BeagleBoard and on the Xperia
smartphone. The BeagleBoard performs better due to its more
powerful CPU: it takes only 3.64ms to encrypt 1024 bytes
packets. Thus, both the BeagleBoard and the Xperia device are
able to generate hundreds of packet encryptions per second,
making encryption an unlikely source of bottlenecks.
FitLock overhead on webserver. We further examined the
packet decryption overhead on the webserver using the above
mentioned protocols. Figure 13(c) shows the dependence of
the decryption time on the packet size. RC4 and Salsa20
perform better than AES. Even for 1024 byte packets, the
average decryption overheads for RC4, Salsa20 and AES are
0.69ms, 1.01ms and 1.31ms respectively.
End-to-end FitLock overhead. Finally, we report the mea-
sured end-to-end performance of FitLock and compare it
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Fig. 14. Comparison of end-to-end delay between the current Fitbit solution
and our proposed encrypted solution
against the performance of Fitbit. We have implemented and
tested both Fitbit and FitLock on our testbed. Figure 14 shows
our results split into the times of each of the 4 phases of
the webserver-to-tracker communication protocol described in
Figure 3. We have set the secret key size to 256 bits. The end-
to-end (sum over all 4 phases) time of the FitLock protocol
is 1518ms. The total time of Fitbit is 1481ms. Thus, FitLock
adds an overhead of 37ms, accounting for 2.4.% of Fitbit’s
time.
VII. RELATED WORK
Halperin et al. [20] demonstrated attacks on pacemakers and
implantable cardiac defibrillators, and proposed zero-power
defenses. Similarly, Li et. al. [21] demonstrated successful se-
curity attacks on a commercially deployed glucose monitoring
and insulin delivery system and provided defenses against the
proposed attacks. Proximity-based access control [22] has been
proposed as a technique for implantable medical devices to
verify the distance of the communicating peer before initiating
wireless communication, thereby limiting attackers to a certain
physical range. Although similar in overall objectives, our
work differs significantly in the attack methodologies and
proposed defenses.
Barnickel et al. [23] targeted security and privacy issues for
HealthNet, a health monitoring and recording system. They
proposed a security and privacy aware architecture, relying
on data avoidance, data minimization, decentralized storage,
and the use of cryptography. Marti et al. [24] described the
requirements and implementation of the security mechanisms
for MobiHealth, a wireless mobile health care system. Mo-
biHealth relies on Bluetooth and ZigBee link layer security
for communication to the sensors and uses HTTPS mutual
authentication and encryption for connections to the backend.
Lim et al. [25] analyzed the security of a remote cardiac
monitoring system. The data transfer was modeled as starting
from the sensors, reaching a Body Area network (BAN) gate-
way, then a wireless router and through the Internet to a final
monitoring server. Muraleedharan et al. [26] proposed two
types of possible denial-of-service attacks including Sybil [27]
and wormhole [28] attacks in a health monitoring system using
wireless sensor networks. They further proposed an energy-
efficient cognitive routing algorithm to deal with those attacks.
Sriram et. al. [29] took an in-depth look at potential
health-monitoring usage scenarios and highlighted research
challenges required to ensure and assess quality of sensor
data in health-monitoring systems. The work of Stanford [30]
stresses the need of meeting stringent privacy and security re-
quirements, especially to protect confidential medical records
and the organizations and end users that employ them.
Bottom line. Most related work either (i) proposes a novel
system with embedded defense mechanisms to handle security
and privacy issues or (ii) introduces different attacks against
the wireless network communication in a health monitoring
system. Our work not only provides hands-on attacks for
a popular fitness and healthcare tracking system but also
provides efficient end-to-end defenses and proves their efficacy
in preventing and thwarting attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed security and privacy issues
related to a renowned and widely accepted and used fitness
tracking system. We showed that through reverse engineering
of the ANT protocol and data communication, both passive
and active attacks can be launched on the system using off-
the-shelf software module. We then analyzed the various attack
scenarios and also proposed various types of possible defenses
against them. We believe that our proposed attack methodol-
ogy and defenses may be applicable to several wearable and
implantable healthcare systems. Healthcare appliance security
is a critical challenge that demands the immediate attention of
the research community.
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